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There is an increasing need for multi-agent systems to operate under decentralised control
regimes that support openness (individual components can enter and leave at will) and enable
components representing distinct stakeholders with different aims and objectives to interact ef-
fectively. To this end, this thesis explores issues associated with using techniques from Game
Theory and Mechanism Design to organise and analyse such systems. In particular, emphasis
is given to distributed mechanisms in which there is distributed allocation (no single centre de-
termines the allocation of the resources or the tasks) and distributed information (agents require
information privately known by other agents in order to determine their own valuation or cost).
Such mechanisms are important because, in comparison to their centralised counterparts, they
are robust to a single-point failure, the computational burden can be potentially shared amongst
many agents, and there is a reduction in bottlenecks since not all communication need pass
through a single point. As a result, distributed mechanisms are better suited to many types of
multi-agent application.
To provide a grounding for the mechanisms we develop, the thesis contains a running example
of a multi-sensor network scenario. In these systems, distributed allocation mechanisms are de-
sirable since they are robust and reduce bottlenecks in the communication system. Furthermore,
we show that distributed information naturally arises by deriving an information-theoretic val-
uation function. This scenario also gives rise to two additional requirements that are addressed
within this thesis: (i) constrained capacity, whereby suppliers can only provide a limited amount
of goods or services at any given time and (ii) uncertainty in task completion, whereby sensors
potentially fail after they have been assigned tasks.
Speciﬁcally, we focus on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms and investigate ways
of extending it so as to address the requirements that arise within distributed setting in general
and sensor networks. In particular, we choose the VCG as our point of departure since it is
a mechanism that is efﬁcient, individually rational and incentive compatible. Unfortunately, it
is brittle in the sense that it does not conserve these desirable properties when considering the
requirements that we outlined above. Therefore, we develop novel mechanisms that do.
In more detail, the ﬁrst part of this thesis considers two distributed allocation mechanisms —
a simultaneous auction environment and Continuous Double Auction (CDA). In the former,
bidders place sealed bids in a number of selling auctions which are concurrently offering items.
This results in a distributed allocation whereby the winner at each auction is determined by
the seller conducting it. For this case, we derive the optimal strategy of the bidders using a
game-theoretic approach. In the CDA, buyers and sellers, respectively, submit bids and asks
continuously and the market clears when a bid is higher than an ask; meaning that the allocation
isagaindeterminedinadistributedway. Furthermore, CDAsareknowntoyieldclosetoefﬁcient
allocations, under certain conditions, even when utilising very simple strategies. However, inii
our case, we need to modify their format in order to deal with the requirement of constrained
capacity. In both of these mechanisms, we study the system’s loss in efﬁciency that ensues from
distributing the allocation and ﬁnd that it is 1
e in the simultaneous auction case and upto 35% in
the continuous double auction case.
The second part of this thesis is concerned with designing mechanisms when agents have distrib-
uted information within the system. Such settings are more general than those more traditionally
studied in that they encompass the fact that agents can potentially change their valuation or cost
upon knowing a signal about the system (which they have not observed) that was hitherto un-
known to them. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst show that interdependent valuations arise naturally within
a sensor network when we develop an information-theoretic valuation function. To account for
this, we signiﬁcantly extend the VCG mechanism in order to deal with these interdependent
valuations. We then go on to develop a mechanism that can deal with uncertainty in task allo-
cation. In both of these cases, our mechanisms are shown to be efﬁcient, individually rational
and incentive compatible. Moreover, their computational properties are studied and efﬁcient
algorithms are designed (based on linear and dynamic programming) in order to speed up the
computation of the allocation problem which is generally NP-hard.LIST OF FIGURES vii
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Another example is in peer-to-peer systems where the case of free-riding (i.e. where agents
under-state their available resource so as not to be asked to contribute to the system) has been
well documented [Adar and Huberman, 2000]. In both of these cases and many others besides,
the safest assumption to make is that if agents can act so as to get more beneﬁt, then they will do
so. Thus, by default, agents should be assumed to be self-interested, rational problem solvers.
Stated in this way, it is obvious that microeconomics [MasColell et al., 1995] — the study of
the decision-making behaviour of self-interested agents as they interact with their environment
— should be able to provide useful insights into the design process for systems that operate a
decentralised control regime. Speciﬁcally, a clear parallel emerges between the self-interested
agents that are trying to ﬁnd their best strategy in large, open, distributed computer systems and
the economic model of rational beings trying to maximise their gain from a market. In particular,
therearetwopointsoffocusfromwhichadesignerneedstocarryoutanon-cooperativestrategic
analysis. In the ﬁrst one, the designer of a system can only impose the protocol (and has no
controloverwhatstrategiestheagentsadopt)anddesignsitsoastoensurethatcertainproperties
are guaranteed within the desired protocol. In the second one, the designer of a participating
agent is faced with a particular system having a pre-speciﬁed protocol and designs the strategy
of an agent such that it maximises its utility (or proﬁt) in the system.
Given this insight, this thesis focuses on applying the theories developed in microeconomics
to the analysis and design of distributed protocols for MASs, that is, protocols in which the
allocation of resources and the gathering of information are carried out by multiple agents (cf.
the gathering of information into a single agent (the centre) which then determines the allocation
incentralisedprotocols). Infact, thesemarket-basedtechniquesarealreadystartingtobeapplied
in domains such as grid computing [Wolski et al., 2001], peer-to-peer systems [Shneidman and
Parkes, 2003], multirobot coordination [Gerkey and Mataric, 2002b] and mobile computing
[Bredin et al.]. In this vein, in this thesis, we choose the particular application scenario of Multi-
Sensor Networks (MSNs) where each sensor node is represented as an agent (the justiﬁcation
for this choice is given in section 1.2). Thus, we will take into consideration the particular
constraints that these MSNs impose on the design process. Speciﬁcally, in a MSN, a distributed
control scheme is preferred since a trusted centre that decides on the outcome may not always
be present or desirable (since it is then a critical single point of failure). Furthermore, as a result
of physical and temporal constraints, a single sensor may not be able to be tasked to do all the
readings required within the system (e.g. the maximum number of readings a sensor can make
may be limited by its battery power or the maximum swivel speed of its sensor head). Moreover,
in MSNs, the distributed information gathered is typically fused together which means that the
value of an observation is contingent on signals that are observed by other agents. Finally,
sensors might fail in undertaking tasks that have been assigned to them. These failures may
occur due to uncontrolled reasons (e.g. a sudden battery failure will stop a sensor from making
a reading of the environment) or due to a conscious decision (e.g. the sensor diverts resources
to another more rewarding task).Chapter 1 Introduction 12
FIGURE 1.1: An overview of a MSN showing the physical components of a sensor node, the
decisions faced by an agents controlling a node, and common problems encountered within the
network.Chapter 1 Introduction 13
in order to achieve a distributed control regime (e.g. [Gerkey and Mataric, 2002a; Sadagopan
and Krishnamachari, 2004; Rogers et al., 2005]), whilst [Dash et al., 2005] consider sensors that
are selﬁsh due to their distinct ownerships. We consider each of these main items of related
work in turn.
In more detail, Gerkey and Mataric [2002a] develop the MURDOCH protocol, which is loosely
based on a multiple auction model, for task allocation amongst a system of robots (which is a
collectionofsensorsandactuators). Morespeciﬁcally, inoneparticularinstanceofthisprotocol,
the following correspondence with auctions would hold: the item being auctioned would be a
task, the auctioneer would be the robot requesting the task, and the bid is a ﬁtness measure which
other idle robots provide. However, since they are operating within a cooperative environment
no payments are made in the system. Rather, selﬁshness and the auction protocol are used as a
means of carrying out a distributed allocation mechanism. The concept of selﬁshness is further
investigated in [Sadagopan and Krishnamachari, 2004] where they study how the routing of data
from sensors to a certain destination in the MSN. They construct a game whereby despite the
selﬁsh actions of the agents, an optimal load-balanced data gathering tree results in the network.
However, the concept of selﬁshness is selectively applied since the agents higher up in the data
gathering tree have to commit to providing bandwidth for transmission of data until they are
saturated. These agents are thus providing a service for no apparent gain. Rogers et al. [2005]
correct this by designing a protocol in which parent nodes in the networks are incentivised to
forward data by the payments provided by the child nodes. These payments are conditioned on
the power that a sensor expends when forwarding data and the resulting protocol has a close to
optimal performance. However, the designed payment protocol is based on the assumption of
an inverse square power law governing the power expenditure (and hence is not generalisable to
cases where this law is not obeyed) and is not robust to selﬁshness since it does not contain a way
of guaranteeing that the parent node will conform to the protocol once it has been paid (such as
in [Blankenburg et al., 2005]). The selﬁshness-related drawbacks of the systems discussed here
are not major if the whole system is owned by a single stakeholder who can program each sensor
to behave as it wishes. This is because the sensors will then conform to the designed protocol
and selﬁshness is used as a means to achieve a decentralised allocation scheme. However, it
also implies that these systems would fail if they were adopted in a context where the sensors
are owned by different stakeholders and thus are selﬁsh by nature rather than by design. This
is because such sensors will be designed by each individual stakeholder that can take advantage
of these drawbacks for their selﬁsh gain, which will, in turn lead to a degradation of system
performance.
In contrast, in [Dash et al., 2005] a centralised auction is designed for the allocation of data
between self-interested sensors. In this protocol, the value the sensors place on data gathered
from other sensors is dependent on their own private information, as well as that of the other
sensors. A trusted centre computes the allocation and then provides the payments once the
allocation is carried out. This protocol is discussed in greater depth in chapter 5.Chapter 1 Introduction 20
application of a penalty scheme is sufﬁcient to ensure desirable economic properties of the
mechanism. We also study the computational complexity of ﬁnding the best allocation using
this protocol. We then analyse the CDA where both sellers and buyers participate in a market
and thus the items that needs to be allocated are distributed over all agents in the systems, but
every agent knows which items are being allocated and the status of the market. We study the
economic properties of our modiﬁed CDA protocol by using very simple strategies and show
that the performance of this protocol is satisfactory when compared to the centralised protocol.
In Chapters 5 and 6, we study another form of distribution, namely the distribution of infor-
mation (which can be characterised as the interdependence of valuations). Chapter 5 develops
a general mechanism for the case when there are multiple items in the market and the valua-
tions of a buyer depend on its own observation, as well as signals observed by other buyers in
the system. To this end, in Chapter 6, we look at a particular form of interdependent signals,
namely trust, and develop a mechanism that incentivises the agents to report truthfully about
their observed trust measure.
More speciﬁcally, in Chapter 5, we argue that interdependent valuations are common in MASs
and then go on to develop a general mechanism that has desirable economic properties. We
study its computational properties and show that the mechanism adds a computational load
only on the centre (as compared to classic mechanisms). We also investigate an application
for this mechanism which concerns a multi-sensor target detection scenario in which multiple
individually-owned sensors are monitoring a particular area with each sensor having a particular
accuracy of measurement. We model this as a MAS and propose a valuation function based
around Information Theory that calculates the value each sensor has for information gained by
other sensors.
In Chapter 6 we design a mechanism in which the uncertainty in the completion of a task is
taken into account. We ﬁrst investigate the case when each agent can report on its own uncer-
tainty. We then analyse the more general case where each agent can report on other agents’
uncertainties. Thus, we cannot hope to achieve a strong equilibrium (like in Chapter 5) and in-
stead opt for a weaker equilibrium condition (ex-ante Nash equilibrium). We analyse the prop-
erties of this mechanism and benchmark it against other comparable mechanisms. We study
the computational properties of our mechanism and implement it using both linear and dynamic
programming techniques that reduce the amount of computation required for ﬁnding the optimal
allocations and payments by reducing the size of the search space and reusing past solutions.
Finally in Chapter 7, we summarize the main achievements of this thesis and how well they
satisfy the requirements discussed in this chapter. We also discuss the broad future research
directions that have been identiﬁed for the ﬁelds of DMD and its application within MSNs.34
The ﬁrst part of this thesis will consider issues associated with distributed allocation mecha-
nisms. This is a core challenge within distributed mechanisms (as highlighted in red in ﬁgure
I.1). Speciﬁcally, this challenge considers how to design mechanisms when there is no trusted
centre who collects data from all the agents and determines the allocation of resources and pay-
ments within the system.
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FIGURE I.1: The challenges addressed and the design perspective of part I of the thesis
Within distributed allocation mechanisms, the allocation of resources and payments must be
determined via the interactions of each agent rather than at a central point. Such mechanisms
are very attractive for sensor networks since they have the advantages of tractability, robust-
ness, trustworthiness and reduction of bottlenecks (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed discus-
sion). Now, within a cooperative setting, distributed task allocation has been extensively studied
[Lesser and Corkill, 1981; Jennings and Bussmann, 2003; Pynadath and Tambe, 2003; Kraus
et al., 1998]. However, the implementation of these mechanisms remain a challenge when con-
sidering selﬁsh agents since these agents act to maximise their own utilities and therefore would
not collaborate unless there is an incentive to do so. As a result, the distributed allocation
mechanisms we study in this thesis all show a certain loss of efﬁciency when compared to their
centralised counterparts.
In more detail, Chapter 3 reports on the optimal strategies that should be adopted by agents
within a simultaneous auction environment. Here the distributed allocation occurs since each of
the seller agents independently determine which buyer agent will be allocated their service. We
then analyse another distributed mechanism based on the CDA in Chapter 4 whilst considering35
constrained capacity suppliers. In this case, the distributed allocation emerges out of the interac-
tions between buyers and sellers. In order to benchmark the distributed mechanism, we design
a centralised protocol for this scenario.Chapter 3 A Mechanism Employing Simultaneous Auctions 54
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FIGURE 3.5: Expected efﬁciency of distributed market (singly-endowed sellers and single-
object buyers) of homogeneous goods with upto 15 sellers and 25 buyers and buyers’ valuations
drawn from a uniform distribution.
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and we ﬁnd that a bidder beneﬁts by bidding optimally in multiple auctions. For the more com-
plex setting with multiple global bidders, the simulation can thus be used to ﬁnd these bids for
speciﬁc cases.
Finally, we compare the efﬁciency of a market with multiple simultaneous auctions with and
without a global bidder. We show that, if the bidder can accurately predict the number of local
biddersineachauction, theefﬁciencyslightlyincreases. Incontrast, ifthereismuchuncertainty,
the efﬁciency signiﬁcantly decreases as the number of auctions increases due to the increased
probability that a global bidder wins more than two items. These results show that the way
in which the efﬁciency and thus social welfare is affected by a global bidder depends on the
information available to a global bidder.
In sum, this chapter has studied a basic distributed allocation mechanism and in doing so has
addressed requirement 1 outlined in Chapter 1. Furthermore, whilst we focused on deriving
the strategies of the bidders within this distributed mechanism, we will change the focus to the
design of protocols in the following chapters. Hence, this chapter provides us with a baseline
efﬁciency of a distributed allocation mechanisms since the simultaneous auctions environment
studied has not been engineered to achieve efﬁciency. Finally, in the context of MSNs, this
chapter has shown that whilst a decentralised control regime can be achieved, it potentially
comes at the cost of the efﬁciency of the whole system (i.e. the services provided by the selling
sensors will not always end up with those sensors valuing it the most).Chapter 4 Mechanisms with Constrained Capacity Suppliers 61
mechanism is strategyproof and robust to sellers being uncertain about their production capac-
ity1. Furthermore, we show that the mechanism is computationally tractable since the optimal
allocation can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time via the use of a dynamic programming
solution.
However, a potential drawback of our modiﬁed VCG mechanism (indeed of all the mechanisms
in this class) is that it is inherently centralised (as we discussed in chapter 1). That is, the task
allocation is computed by a single entity, the auctioneer, who does so by collecting all the private
information about the costs and capacities from the various agents. Now, in some cases, this is
not a problem and the optimality of the mechanism is the over-riding concern. However, in other
cases, issues such as robustness to a single point of failure and scaleability are more important
and this gives rise to the desire for decentralised mechanisms (see chapter 1). Thus to cope with
this situation, we also consider the decentralised CDA [Smith, 1962; Friedman and Rust, 1992].
In this protocol, buyers and sellers continuously submit bids (an offer to buy at price pb) and asks
(an offer to sell at price pa) respectively (which are listed on a billboard) and the market clears
(i.e. a transaction occurs) whenever the bid of a buyer matches the ask of a seller (i.e. when
pb ≥ pa). Such an auction is decentralised in that the allocation of the tasks is not computed
by any single agent, but rather emerges out of the interactions of the agents in the protocol2.
Nevertheless, despite this decentralisation, CDAs still produce solutions that are very close to
the optimal, even when the participants adopt very simple strategies3.
However, most work on CDAs assumes a cost structure that consists of a ﬁxed marginal cost for
each unit supplied and no start-up cost. This choice of cost structure is quite natural in macro-
economic models and it results both in an equilibrium market price (a unique price at which
buyers and sellers agree to trade) for the commodity and in efﬁcient allocations [MasColell
et al., 1995]. Unfortunately, the particular cost structure of our domain implies that no such
equilibrium exists. This is due to the fact that the average unit cost of producing lower quantities
is greater than that when producing larger quantities as a result of the start-up cost (this is
akin to models where there are economies of scale in which the start-up cost is shared over
a greater product run [MasColell et al., 1995]). The presence of a capacity constraint further
complicates matters since, in general, a single seller will not be able to fully satisfy the total
demand. Furthermore, sincewearedevelopingaprotocolfortaskallocation, weconsiderbuyers
with inelastic demand (i.e. buyers do not vary their demand according to price) which, in turn,
means that the CDA is focused on ﬁnding the cheapest set of seller(s) given an exact demand
1In certain scenarios, sellers may be uncertain about their capacity and would only have a best estimate of that
capacity (e.g. in power generation scenarios a wind farm’s capacity will depend on the strength of the wind and in a
job-shop scheduling context the capacity of a machine might degrade stochastically over time).
2Even the seemingly centralised billboard in the CDA can be implemented using a broadcast communication
protocol that mimics the typical “shouts” in the original trading pit [Friedman and Rust, 1992].
3In this context, a strategy is simply a method of generating a bid or an ask given the observed current market
conditions (see Chapter 2). In CDAs, it has been shown that a strategy that randomly generates bids/asks between
a set lower and upper bound can be extremely efﬁcient (both for the individual participant and in terms of the
effectiveness of the overall market). Such strategies are known as zero-intelligence (ZI) strategies [Gode and Sunder,
1993].Chapter 4 Mechanisms with Constrained Capacity Suppliers 65
over the success of a transaction and thus their mechanism is more appropriate in an iterated
marketplace where the consumers can form an opinion about the success rate of each producer.
As a result, in their case, the consumers bear the risk of correctly evaluating the success rate of
a producer, unlike in our mechanism where it is upto the producers to correctly estimate their
capacities.
The double auction class of market mechanism consists fundamentally of two categories: the
clearing-house and the CDA. The former involves all bids and asks being submitted to an auc-
tioneer and the market being cleared periodically by that auctioneer (who calculates the alloca-
tion) [Friedman and Rust, 1992]. In contrast, the latter clears continuously, with the competition
in the market deciding the allocation rather than an auctioneer[Friedman and Rust, 1992]. In
this context, one particularly relevant application of the double auction is by [Nicolaisen et al.,
2001] in a wholesale electricity market. Speciﬁcally, they use a clearing-house double auction
with discriminatory pricing. Now, while they do not look at the complexity involved with a cost
structure, they do describe a market mechanism for resource allocation. In particular, the agents
populating their markets adopt a sophisticated bidding behaviour (a modiﬁed Roth-Erev Rein-
forcement Learning algorithm [Roth and Erev, 1995]), and they evaluate the efﬁciency of their
mechanism using such strategies. Other relevant works on the double auction include that by
[McCabe et al., 1992] on the design of a clearing-house, and [Xia et al., 2004] on solving com-
binatorial double auction mechanisms. However, none of these mechanisms are decentralised
since they involve an auctioneer that computes the allocation and prices.
Speaking more generally, most research on the CDA has been on the structure and behaviour of
themechanism. Indeed, theinitialstimulationforthisworkcomesfromtheﬁeldofexperimental
economics where experiments with human volunteers showed that small groups of traders could
quickly ﬁnd the equilibrium price in simulated single commodity markets [Smith, 1962; Gode
and Sunder, 1993]. In line with this seminal work, many researchers then extended these simple
trading strategies to generate sophisticated software agents that are capable of observing the
trading behaviour of other agents in order to learn the market equilibrium price of a commodity,
and thus trade more efﬁciently [Tesauro and Bredin, 2002; Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998; He
et al., 2003; Vytelingum et al., 2004]. However, in all of this work, the existence of the market
equilibrium at which both buyers and sellers seek to trade is a consequence of the assumption
of a cost structure with an increasing marginal cost and no startup cost. Unfortunately, the
cost structure of our domain destroys this market equilibrium and thus the close to optimal
efﬁciency usually obtained by CDAs cannot be guaranteed. Speciﬁcally, this is because the
different startup costs and the inelastic demand mean that a single price on which buyers and
sellers agree to trade cannot be reached. To remedy this, we develop a variant of the CDA that is
still reasonably efﬁcient, but that can deal with the speciﬁc cost structure and capacity constraint
in our domain.Chapter 4 Mechanisms with Constrained Capacity Suppliers 83
over 2000 independent rounds) is shown in ﬁgure 4.6, where the optimal production cost is nor-
malised to 1, while the total production cost of the centralised and the decentralised mechanisms
are shown in ﬁgure 4.5. As can be seen, the mechanism is efﬁcient with an average efﬁciency
of 83% (and a minimum efﬁciency of 53% when demand is relatively low) for market B and an
average efﬁciency of 86% (and a minimum efﬁciency of 67%) for market A. In both cases, the
minimum efﬁciency case occurs when the demand is split amongst many more suppliers than
are actually needed (with respect to the optimal allocation). This increases the overall cost of
supply as a result of the ﬁxed cost of the extraneous suppliers. However, in the typical CDA, the
worst-case analysis considers the average efﬁciency of ZI agents [Gode and Sunder, 1993]. This
is because although it is theoretically possible for an allocation of very low efﬁciency to occur,
in almost every run (higher than 99% of the time), the CDA implemented with agents employing
the ZI strategy has a high efﬁciency. Thus, it is the zero-intelligence nature of the strategy which
provides a lower bound on measuring efﬁciency and, we expect the average efﬁciency with a
more informed strategy to be better [Cliff and Bruten, 1997; He et al., 2003; Vytelingum et al.,
2004]. We thererefore adopt this approach in discussing the inherent efﬁciency of our CDA
mechanism.
In the experiments with each market, we observe an increasing trend whereby the market efﬁ-
ciency increases as total demand approaches the maximum capacity of the sellers. It can also be
seen that there is a high variance when the total demand is relatively low. Considering specif-
ically the set of experiments with market A, the intuitions behind these observations are as
follows. The variance of the market efﬁciency is generally higher when the total demand is low.
This is because the optimal allocation for a total demand of 100 is completely covered by seller
1 (with a marginal cost of 1.5 and a startup cost of 100). However, our market mechanism does
not ensure that only seller 1 will trade and, thus, sellers 2 and 3 may also be part of this alloca-
tion for the total demand of 100. The high variance is principally an artifact of the additional
startup costs if more than one seller were to trade. As the total demand increases past 175, the
optimal allocation is covered by at least two sellers. Again, the variance past the demand of 175
is the result of sellers supplying different numbers of units at different marginal costs, with at
most one additional startup cost. When the total demand is very high, close to the total capacity,
all the sellers participate in the allocation, and the small variance is solely due to the sellers
providing different numbers of units (a difference which is relatively low compared to the total
startup cost). The observations in the set of experiments with market B can also be explained by
the same reasoning, with the higher variance occurring when demand that can be covered by a
single seller is distributed among multiple sellers.
Furthermore, we can explain the increasing trend of the market efﬁciency seen in ﬁgure 4.5.
Considering market A, a demand of up to 175 can be provided by only 1 seller. The jumps in
ﬁgure 4.5 correspond to the optimal allocation changing between a combination of one to three
sellers. For example, jumps at 100 and 150 correspond to the optimal allocation starting with
seller 1, changing to seller 2 and ﬁnally to seller 3. The increase in efﬁciency as total demand
increases is the result of the number of sellers involved in the optimal allocation, changing fromChapter 4 Mechanisms with Constrained Capacity Suppliers 84
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FIGURE 4.7: The sellers’ total proﬁt given different demands (for market A with 3 buyers and
3 sellers and market B with 15 buyers and 15 sellers.
a single seller (up to a total demand of 175) to three sellers (past a total demand of 325 which is
the highest demand any two sellers can cover). However, in our market, any number of sellers
can trade at any time. Thus, as total demand increases, the loss in efﬁciency that arises from
the extra startup costs (compared to the optimal allocation) decreases which in turn explains the
generally increasing trend. In the simulations with market B, a similar trend can be observed,
with a lower efﬁciency when demand is lower than the minimum sellers’ capacity (210). As
in market A, there are more inefﬁcient allocations that can arise when demand is low (and can
be satisﬁed by a single seller), which would decrease the average efﬁciency much more than
it would given a smaller number of inefﬁcient allocations. Here, we use the same reasoning
as in market A to explain the jumps, which are larger in number given the larger number of
participants.
As well as being efﬁcient, the simulation results in ﬁgure 4.7 show that, broadly, the sellers and
buyers do indeed equally share the market proﬁts (the ratio of sellers’ proﬁts to total market
proﬁt is approximately equal to 0.5 in both cases). This fair division of proﬁts arises from the
design of the clearing rule (see section 4.6.1). This is important because this proﬁtability means
that the agents are incentivised to enter the market which means our distributed mechanism can
be viewed as being individually rational.
Having analysed two different markets (A and B) in detail, we now examine how the efﬁciencyChapter 4 Mechanisms with Constrained Capacity Suppliers 86
is robust to uncertainties in the capacities of the agents. We then presented a dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm, that solves the task allocation problem of the centre in pseudo-polynomial
time.
In the second mechanism, we extend the standard format of a CDA so as to develop a decen-
tralised mechanism for resource allocation in the same context. We ﬁnd that this mechanism has
a fairly high inherent average efﬁciency (over 65% in the examples we study) by testing it with
a variant of the ZI strategy.
When taken together, we ﬁnd that these mechanisms represent a trade-off in terms of efﬁciency
and the decentralisation of a mechanism (in the examples we consider, the loss in efﬁciency
can range from 0% to 50% depending on the demand and number of buyers and sellers in the
market). However, both mechanisms still ensure that the participants derive a proﬁt by joining
the mechanism, thereby justifying their use with selﬁsh agents.
In sum, in this chapter, we have designed two mechanisms for addressing requirement 2 in the
list detailed in chapter 1(namely the requirement for mechanisms that deal with constrained ca-
pacity). Furthermore, the distributed CDA mechanism addresses requirement 1 in that it is a
distributed allocation mechanism. This chapter concludes part I of this thesis. We have found
that whilst there are numerous advantages to implementing distributed allocation mechanisms
(see Chapter 1) there is usually an efﬁciency cost associated with distributed allocation mech-
anisms. Chapter 3 showed that in the case of rational agents, this efﬁciency is lower bounded
at 1 − 1
e. In this chapter, we showed that the average efﬁciency of a mechanism based on the
CDA can drop to around 65% when agents within the system are employing a zero-intelligence
strategy. Thus, in the context of MSNs, it will be imperative to judge whether these distributed
mechanisms justify their efﬁciency cost. The next part of this thesis will now consider distrib-
uted information mechanisms. In these mechanisms, the agents do not form their valuation or
cost solely their privately observed type (as considered so far) but also on those of other agents
within the system.88
The previous part of this thesis (Chapters 3 and 4) considered issues associated with mechanisms
that enable distributed allocations. In this part of this thesis, we switch the focus to distributed
information which is another core challenge within distributed mechanisms (as depicted in ﬁg-
ure II.1). Speciﬁcally, this challenge considers how to design mechanisms when the agents
determine their valuations of goods within a market from distributed pieces of information that
are privately known by other agents within the system.
 Distributed Mechanism
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FIGURE II.1: The challenges addressed and the design perspective of part II of the thesis.
Now, it could be argued that traditional auction mechanisms already aggregate distributed pieces
of information from different agents in order to determine the outcome of the mechanism. How-
ever, thesemechanismsonlydealwithprivatesignals, whereanagentcanformulateitsvaluation
of a good or service once it is aware of its own signal. This is, therefore, only a very limited
form of distributed information whereby only the centre requires these distributed pieces of in-
formation so as to determine the outcome of the mechanism (i.e. the allocation of resources
and transfers of money). A more general form of distributed information occurs when every
agent within the system is potentially reliant on the signals observed by other agents in order to
formulate their valuations of goods or services. In this case, the agents cannot determine their
valuations until they know the signals observed by the other agents. However, since the agents
are selﬁsh, they would not share this information unless they have an incentive to do so. Given
this, this part of the thesis considers how to provide these incentives to the agents within the sys-
tem, whilst still preserving certain desirable system properties such as efﬁciency and individual
rationality.
In more detail, Chapter 5 reports on the design of an efﬁcient and individually rational protocol
for allocating multiple items to buyers who have interdependent valuations. Here the distributed89
information occurs since the agents require the private observations of other agents in order
to formulate their interdependent valuation. We then consider in Chapter 6 a speciﬁc type of
interdependent valuation which arises out of the uncertainty that agents have concerning the
success rate of other agents within the system. In this case, the distributed information is of
the form of the reports an agent gathers from other agents within the system in order to form
perceptions about the success rates of agents within the system.Chapter 5 Mechanisms for Interdependent Valuations 92
To overcome the independent valuation limitation, a number of researchers have developed efﬁ-
cient auctions for interdependent valuation scenarios where a single item is allocated (see Sec-
tions 5.3 and 5.6 for more details). However, in this work we are interested in the case of
multiple items being allocated (i.e where agents may be interested in combinations of items
such as a bundle of services). This extension also allows us to consider the important case of
combinatorial allocations. These allocations deal with items exhibiting complementarities and
substitutabilities and are known to be more efﬁcient than multiple concurrent auctions of single
goods (as shown in chapter 3). Such allocations occur in many real world scenarios such as the
grid services and FCC spectrum auctions we mentioned earlier.
Now, as we discuss in Section 5.2, such distributed information also needs to be catered for
within MSNs when data fusion needs to be carried out. In order to address this problem, we
ﬁrst formulate a function that characterises the value that an agent places on a particular piece of
data originating from other agents. We then develop, for the ﬁrst time, a direct mechanism that
can allocate multiple items in an interdependent valuation scenario where each agent receives
a single-dimensional signal (for example, a time of response in the computational economy
or market proﬁtability in the case of the FCC spectrum). We restrict our attention to single-
dimensional signals because in an interdependent valuation scenario it is not possible to develop
an efﬁcient auction for multi-dimensional signals [Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001]1. Moreover, the
single-dimensionality of the signal is not overly restrictive because in many cases the necessary
information can be encompassed into a representative single-dimensional signal. In fact, we
demonstrate in section 5.2, that this is indeed the case for the MSN scenario we study. In
developing this mechanism and studying its application, we advance the state of the art in the
following ways:
1. We formulatea novel valuationfunction basedaround theinformationformofthe Kalman
ﬁlter [Manyika and Durrant-Whyte, 1997] since this is the simplest and most elegant
way of fusing different measurements of the same observation. This function equates
the valuation to the expected gain in information when data from a number of sources is
fused.
2. We extend the standard VCG mechanism to deal with interdependent valuations in the
case of multiple goods in which agents receive a single-dimensional signal.
3. We prove the economic properties of our mechanism. In particular, we show that it is
incentive-compatible, individually rational and efﬁcient.
4. We analyse the computational properties of our mechanism and show that it does not
impose any additional computational load on the agents compared to an independent val-
uation scenario. However, there is a corresponding increase in the centre’s computational
load.
1However Mezzetti [2003] shows that if we adopt a two-stage approach to the auction design, we can then
achieve efﬁciency and incentive-compatibility in certain cases.Chapter 5 Mechanisms for Interdependent Valuations 94
FIGURE 5.1: Figure of the MSN scenario highlighting the interdependent valuation of buyers
considered within this chapter
are currently two main approaches to ﬁnding an efﬁcient mechanism for the allocation of items
with interdependent valuations. Krishna considers a direct mechanism for efﬁcient allocations
for multi-unit single items with single-dimensional signals. In this case, agents submit their
interdependent valuation functions, as well as their signals, to a central auctioneer who then
decides on the efﬁcient allocation. The payment scheme was then devised so that the agents are
incentivised to reveal their signals truthfully. Dasgupta and Maskin have also developed an efﬁ-
cient mechanism for the case of two non-identical items, again with single-dimensional signals.
In their case, agents make contingent bids rather than submitting their valuation functions and
observed signals (i.e. agent 1 submits a range of bids that describes its bid when agent 2 bids a
particular value and vice versa). Thus the bidding is more complex than in Krishna’s mechanism
because the agents have to submit bids based on what other agents might bid, rather than just
revealing their valuation function and signals. This bidding becomes even more complex in theChapter 5 Mechanisms for Interdependent Valuations 96
To recap, the Kalman ﬁlter is an efﬁcient recursive ﬁlter that estimates the state of a dynamic
system from a series of incomplete and noisy measurements [Kalman, 1960]. The observations
within a Kalman ﬁlter are of the form:
z(t) = H(t)y(t) + n(t)
where y(t) is the state of the system at time t, H(t) is the linear observation model and n(t) is a
zero mean random variable drawn from a normal distribution with variance R. The covariance
update component (which measures how the uncertainty in the measurement varies as more data
is collected), P−1(t | t), of the information form of the Kalman ﬁlter for N observations is:
P−1(t | t) = P−1(t | t − 1) +
N  
j=1
HT(j)R−1(j)H(j)
The summation in the above expression represents the decrease in covariance and thus the gain
in information at time t when all the N observations are fused. In the case of our problem the
value of receiving data from another agent can thus be represented by the gain in information
this observation engenders.
In order to achieve an efﬁcient allocation, this gain in information must be calculated from
the measure of the data accuracy prior to actually fusing the data. Thus, we can represent the
measure of accuracy of a data point, θj (which becomes an agent’s type), as its covariance which
is calculated from the covariance of its observation, R(j):
θj = HT(j)R−1(j)H(j) (5.1)
Thus the gain in information of agent i when all relevant data is transmitted to it and fused, can
be expressed as a sum of this measure of accuracy provided by each of the other agents:
vi(θ) = θi +
 
j∈−i
θj (5.2)
where −i = I \ i.
Equations 5.1 and 5.2 thus cast our valuation function in the Kalman ﬁlter form. However, we
need to modify this so as to incorporate the characteristics of our scenario. In particular, in our
scenario each of the sensors has a region of observation which is the area it can sense and a
region of interest which is the area it wishes to gather information about (as shown in ﬁgure
5.2). As a result, all observations may not fall in an agent’s region of observation (as depicted in
ﬁgure 5.2). Furthermore, an agent may not be able to receive all the data due to the bandwidth
constraints of the communication network. Deﬁning αij as the probability that the data observed
by agent j is relevant to agent i and a vector K describing the allocation of the ﬂow of data in
the network, then the expected valuation is:Chapter 5 Mechanisms for Interdependent Valuations 100
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FIGURE 5.3: Figure demonstrating how payments are calculated in Krishna’s mechanism for
single good and interdependent valuations.
3. Each agent i also transmits its observed signal   θi. 4
4. The centre then computes the optimal allocation K∗
0 which is calculated as:
K∗
0 = argmax
K∈K
 
 
i∈I
vi(K,   θ)
 
(5.4)
5. The centre also calculates the payment ri made by each agent i. To do this, the centre ﬁrst
ﬁnds the m next best allocations as the reported signal   θi is decreased, until the presence
of i makes no difference to the allocations. That is, ﬁnd allocations Ki
1 ...Ki
m and the
signal values zl
i such that:
zl
i = inf
 
yi :
 
i∈I
vi(Ki
l,yi,θ−i) =
 
i∈I
vi(Ki
l+1,yi,θ−i)
 
(5.5)
(where each allocation Ki
l is different) until:
zm
i = inf
 
yi :
 
i∈I
vi(Ki
m−1,yi,θ−i) =
 
i∈I
vi(Ki
m,yi,θ−i)
 
(5.6)
4Of course,
b θi may not be equal to θi. However, we prove in section 5.8 that it is a best strategy for the agent to
set
b θi = θi.Chapter 5 Mechanisms for Interdependent Valuations 101
where the allocation Ki
m is the optimal allocation when i does not exist:
Ki
m = argmax
K∈K
 
j∈−i
vj(K,θ)
Then the transfer 5 to buyer i is:
ri =
m−1  
l=0
  
j∈−i
vj(Ki
l,zl
i,θ−i) −
 
j∈−i
vj(Ki
l+1,zl
i,θ−i)
 
(5.7)
The above scheme rests upon making an agent derive a utility equal to the marginal contribution
that its presence makes to the whole system of agents (which is the same intuition as used in
the VCG). Thus the additional part of this mechanism is to take into account the effect that an
agent’s signal θi has on the overall utility of the system.
This mechanism is general and is shown (below) to reduce to the well-known multiple-good
private value model if we take the case of independent valuations (i.e when (vi(θ,.) = vi(θi,.)).
Then the optimal allocation (from equation 5.4) is:
K∗
0 = argmax
K∈K
 
 
i∈I
vi(K,   θi)
 
To calculate the payment scheme, we ﬁrst note that with independent valuations θi only affects
vi(.). Thus repeatedly decreasing θi, until the stopping condition on equation 5.6, does not
change the valuation of the other agents −i on the different allocations. This then implies that
in the payment (as computed by equation 5.7) all the terms cancel each other, except for the ﬁrst
and last, leading to a payment of:
ri =
 
j∈I\i
vj(K∗
0,   θj) −
 
j∈I\i
vj(Ki
m,   θj) (5.8)
This is exactly the payment scheme for the multiple-good private values model which we dis-
cussed in section 2.4.1. Thus, this shows that the classical VCG mechanism is an instance of
the generalised mechanism developed here. Furthermore, notice that assumption 5.2 is automat-
ically satisﬁed in this independent valuation scenario, since
∂vj
∂θi = 0 in such a scenario. Also,
since an increase in θi would only increase vi(.,θi), any increase in θi that induces a new al-
location would imply that the rate of change of vi(.,θi) with respect to θi is higher in the new
allocation than in the previous one. Thus, assumption 5.3 is also automatically satisﬁed in the
independent valuation scenario.
5If the transfer is negative, it implies that buyer i pays to the centre.Chapter 5 Mechanisms for Interdependent Valuations 106
utility of an agent on reporting   θi = θi is:
ui(K∗
0,θ) = vi(K∗
0,θ) +
m−1  
l=0
 
v−i(Ki
l,zl
i,θ−i) − v−i(Ki
l+1,zl
i,θ−i)
 
(5.9)
Now suppose an agent reports   θi  = θi but this does not change the optimal allocation K∗
0
implemented. Then, ui(K∗
0,θ) = ui(K∗
0,   θi,θ−i). This is because the agent will derive the
same value vi(K∗
0,θ) if the allocation does not change and the payment will be the same as the
signals z0
i ...zm
i computed by the centre. Now consider the case that an agent reports   θi < θi
such that this changes the allocation. Then some other optimal allocation, which is necessarily
one of the allocations Ki
1,...,Ki
m, is implemented. Denoting the resulting allocation when
  θi < θi as Ki
n (i.e. zn
i <   θi ≤ zn−1
i ), the utility that the agent gets from this new allocation is
then:
ui(Ki
n,θ) = vi(Ki
n,θ) +
m−1  
l=n
 
v−i(Ki
l,zl
i,θ−i) − v−i(Ki
l+1,zl
i,θ−i)
 
(5.10)
The difference, Dn = ui(Ki
0,θ)−ui(Ki
n,θ) between truthful reporting and under reporting (as
given by equations 5.9 and 5.10 respectively) is:
Dn = vi(K∗
0,θ) − vi(Ki
n,θ) +
n−1  
l=0
 
v−i(Ki
l,zl
i,θ−i) − v−i(Ki
l+1,zl
i,θ−i)
 
= vi(K∗
0,θ) + v−i(K∗
0,z0
i ,θ−i) − v−i(Ki
n,zn
i ,θ−i) − vi(Ki
n,θ)
+
n  
l=1
 
v−i(Ki
l,zl
i,θ−i) − v−i(Ki
l,zl+1
i ,θ−i)
 
Since
∂v−i(Ki
l,θ)
∂θi ≥ 0, we thus have:
Dn > vi(K∗
0,θ) + v−i(K∗
0,z0
i ,θ−i) − v−i(Ki
n,zn
i ,θ−i) − vi(Ki
n,θ)
Now, we can recast the above as:
Dn > vi(K∗
0,θ)−vi(K∗
0,z0
i ,θ−i)−vi(Ki
n,θ)+vi(Ki
n,zn
i ,θ−i)+vI(K∗
0,z0
i ,θ−i)−vI(Ki
n,zn
i ,θ−i)
However, by construction we know that vI(K∗
0,z0
i ,θ−i) > vI(Ki
n,zn
i ,θ−i) and from assump-
tion 5.3 we also know that vi(K∗
0,θ) − vi(K∗
0,z0
i ,θ−i) > vi(Ki
n,θ) − vi(Ki
n,zn
i ,θ−i). We
thus have Dn ≥ 0.
On the other hand, if an agent reports   θi > θi and this induces an allocation Ki
−n, then the utility
it derives is:
ui(Ki
−n,θ,) = vi(Ki
−n,θ,) +
m−1  
l=−n
 
v−i(Ki
l,zl
i,θ−i,) − v−i(Ki
l+1,zl
i,θ−i,)
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the VCG mechanism whenever there are independent valuations (as seen in section 5.7). Thus,
we can visualise our mechanism being used even in MAS where the designer is unsure whether
the valuations are interdependent or not. Finally, we analysed the computational complexity
of implementing the mechanism and compared it to the complexity of implementing its closest
equivalent (in the private value case), namely the VCG mechanism.
Whilst we have presented our mechanism in terms of resource allocation, it can be easily con-
verted into a task allocation scenario. In such a case, agents will ﬁrst submit cost functions
instead of valuation functions. Then, we need to perform a minimisation instead of a maximisa-
tion in equations 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 and take supremums instead of inﬁmums in equations 5.5 and
5.6. With these changes, the mechanism still conserves both its computational and economic
properties in the task allocation scenario.
In sum, this chapter has considered an important class of auctions in which the bidders have
interdependent valuations (based on a single dimensional signal measured by each bidder) and
bid for multiple goods. In so doing, requirement 3 from Chapter 1 (namely the requirement
for mechanisms that deal with distributed information) has been addressed. In the next chapter,
we shall consider a particular type of distributed information that arises when agents depend on
other agents’ reports in order to gauge the success rate of task providers.Chapter 7 Conclusions 140
markets in the absence of global bidders. We then empirically study the efﬁciency of the market
as the number of bidders vary. We show that, if the global bidder can accurately predict the
number of local bidders in each auction, the efﬁciency slightly increases. In contrast, if there
is much uncertainty, the efﬁciency signiﬁcantly decreases as the number of auctions increases
due to the increased probability that a global bidder wins more than two items. These results
demonstrate that the way in which the efﬁciency and, thus the social welfare is affected by a
global bidder depends on the information available to that global bidder.
In Chapter 4, we considered the design of both a centralised and a decentralised protocol in a
scenario where the production costs are characterised by a cost function composed of a ﬁxed
cost, a constant marginal cost and a limited capacity. The centralised mechanism extends the
standard VCG mechanism to this problem domain by introducing a novel penalty scheme. This
resulted in the mechanism being strategyproof, individual rational, efﬁcient and robust to uncer-
tainties in the capacities of the agents. A dynamic programming algorithm, that solves the task
allocation problem of the centre in pseudo-polynomial time, then shows how the mechanism is
also computationally efﬁcient. However, the mechanism is centralised. Therefore, in the second
mechanism, we extend the standard format of a continuous double auction so as to develop a de-
centralised mechanism for resource allocation in the same context. We ﬁnd that this mechanism
has a high inherent average efﬁciency (over 86% in the examples we study) by testing it with a
variant of the zero intelligence strategy. Thus, we ﬁnd that these mechanisms represent a trade-
off in terms of efﬁciency and the decentralisation of a mechanism. However, both mechanisms
still ensure that the participants derive a proﬁt by joining the mechanism, thereby justifying their
use with selﬁsh agents.
Having dealt with distributed allocation in Chapters 3 and 4, the second part of this thesis (Chap-
ters 5 and 6) considers distributed information mechanisms. In Chapter 5, we ﬁrst developed a
utility function for sensors in our MSN scenario based on the information form of the Kalman
ﬁlter. Since these utility function exhibit interdependence, we could not use standard resource
allocation mechanisms. Thus we developed a generic mechanism for interdependent valuations
that signiﬁcantly extends the standard VCG mechanism and proved that the ensuing mecha-
nism has the ideal economic properties of being efﬁcient, incentive compatible and individually
rational. We then showed that this more complex mechanism only increases the centre’s com-
putational burden and the bidding for the agents (which are more likely to be computationally
constrained) is no more demanding than that for the VCG.
In Chapter 6, we considered the case where agents are uncertain about whether other agents will
successfully complete their allocated tasks and have different perceptions about the probability
of success of other agents in the system. In order to deal with this problem, we developed a
trust-based mechanism and proved that it is efﬁcient, individually rational, and incentive com-
patible. We then demonstrated the generality of the mechanism by reducing it to two known
mechanisms, namely the VCG mechanism and Porter et al.’s fault-tolerant mechanism. We
also considered the computational properties of this mechanism and showed that the allocationChapter 7 Conclusions 143
formally establish the consequence of requiring robust mechanisms on the efﬁciency of
the resultant mechanism. Finally, we aim to develop more sophisticated strategies for the
decentralised mechanism in order to enhance the efﬁciency of the system, whilst ensuring
that these sophisticated strategies derive higher proﬁt than their simpler counterparts. This
has been shown to be achievable in simple continuous double auctions. [Cliff and Bruten,
1997; Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998; Vytelingum et al., 2004] and we believe it is also
achievable in our modiﬁed continuous double auction protocol. Such developments will
enable us to more effectively ﬁnd the set of agents that can perform the required task at
the lowest cost (i.e. the efﬁciency will be increased).
• Chapter 5: This chapter developed a valuation function from a relatively simple informa-
tion theoretic base. An extension to this work can consider more complex information
theoretic measures (such as the Kullback-Liebler divergence and the Mahanalobis dis-
tance measure) and to also take into account the relative importance of targets. Another
line of work could consider the design of a distributed mechanism for choosing the op-
timal allocation and calculating the payment. To this end, by showing that a centralised
mechanism exists, one of the necessary conditions for the existence of a decentralised
mechanism has been satisﬁed. Given this, we intend to explore techniques such as those
developed in [Parkes and Shneidman, 2004] in order to develop a distributed form of this
mechanism. However, it is important to point out that in our mechanism, as it currently
stands, the agents only transmit a representative value to the centre (rather than the data
itself). Thus, any distributed data fusion algorithm can conceivably be implemented in our
scenario as long as we can formulate such a representative value (which would typically
have a much lower bandwidth requirement than the data itself).
• Chapter 6: In this chapter, the focus was on an efﬁcient mechanism which therefore re-
quired exact solutions. In future work we aim to ﬁnd an approximate mechanism that
is guaranteed to be efﬁcient within a certain bound. This reduces the extra computa-
tional burden involved when taking into account trust in combinatorial exchanges. It will
also allow the development of local search algorithms that will further reduce the com-
putation involved in ﬁnding the efﬁcient allocation. Furthermore, our current mechanism
is incentive-compatible, thus providing no incentive for agents to deviate from truthful
behaviour within a single-shot allocation. In future, we aim to investigate iterative mech-
anisms which prevent agents from strategizing over rounds and induces truthful behaviour
across rounds.